It's time for Conservative minority brinksmanship
It's time for Conservative minority brinksmanship
By TOM FLANAGAN
Professor of political science at University of Calgary; former Conservative campaign manager
Wednesday, August 1, 2007 – Page A15
With the passage of Bill C-16 this spring, the federal government joined British Columbia, Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador in adopting fixed election dates. The main purpose of the reform is to prevent governments from manipulating the date of a coming election for partisan advantage. Indeed, this has been a serious concern, as shown by Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, who held early elections in 1997, 2000, and 2004 to take advantage of newly chosen leaders of other parties. But, according to the Law of Unintended Consequences, which tells us that even the most well-intentioned and justified reforms can create unexpected problems, it is becoming apparent that fixed election dates have upset the balance of terror between government and opposition in a minority Parliament.
Traditionally, governors-general have granted prime ministers a general election whenever asked, assuming the government had survived an initial period, usually thought to be about six months. Three Canadian prime ministers presiding over minorities have used this power to engineer subsequent victories: Mackenzie King in 1926, John Diefenbaker in 1958 and Pierre Trudeau in 1968. Three times in a century is not a lot, but the very existence of the power made opposition parties more reasonable. They knew that if they obstructed the government too much, they might face an unwanted election.
For a while in early 2007, the opposition seemed to believe Prime Minister Stephen Harper would call an election, even though he had campaigned on fixed election dates, had introduced C-16 and would have looked ridiculous if he had asked for a dissolution. But once the legislation passed, the opposition parties, especially the Liberals, became noticeably more obstructionist, using committees to block government legislation and combining to pass private members' bills directly contrary to government policies already approved in the budget. Moreover, the Liberals ratcheted up their own special brand of obstruction by blocking measures in the Senate after appearing to support them in the Commons.
Before the passage of C-16, a prime minister could have responded by declaring gridlock and asking for an election. Even a behind-the-scenes threat to that effect would have probably sobered up the opposition parties because none actually want an election right now. But with C-16 in place, the government may have to resort to different tactics, declaring high-priority bills to be matters of confidence and daring the opposition to defeat them.
So far, this government has attached confidence only to budgetary bills, following the example of recent Liberal minority governments, such as Mr. Trudeau's in 1972-74 and Mr. Martin's in 2004-05. That is, indeed, the most sensible strategy when your main concern is survival.
However, the Conservatives have shown their staying power, and are well prepared for an election. In contrast, none of the three opposition parties seems to want an election. The Liberals have saddled themselves with an unimpressive leader, have not yet mastered modern fundraising techniques and are organizationally unprepared for the campaign trail. The New Democrats are fighting for space with the Greens. The Bloc Québécois was lucky to have lost just three seats in 2006 and must fear further losses whenever the next writ is dropped, now that the Conservatives have become competitive in francophone Quebec.
Surviving for 18 months has been an impressive achievement for the Conservatives, but mere survival will become increasingly less rewarding unless it is matched by legislative achievement. No government can survive politically if it acquires a reputation for weakness, and that is the risk the Conservatives face if they remain tied up in Parliament.
By using confidence measures more aggressively, the Conservatives can benefit politically. If the opposition parties retreat, the government gets its legislation. If the opposition unites on a matter of confidence, the Conservatives get an election for which they are the best prepared.
"Fortune is a woman," Machiavelli wrote in a now politically incorrect aphorism, "and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force." It is time for the government to take advantage of its advantages.
By TOM FLANAGAN
Professor of political science at University of Calgary; former Conservative campaign manager
Wednesday, August 1, 2007 – Page A15
With the passage of Bill C-16 this spring, the federal government joined British Columbia, Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador in adopting fixed election dates. The main purpose of the reform is to prevent governments from manipulating the date of a coming election for partisan advantage. Indeed, this has been a serious concern, as shown by Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, who held early elections in 1997, 2000, and 2004 to take advantage of newly chosen leaders of other parties. But, according to the Law of Unintended Consequences, which tells us that even the most well-intentioned and justified reforms can create unexpected problems, it is becoming apparent that fixed election dates have upset the balance of terror between government and opposition in a minority Parliament.
Traditionally, governors-general have granted prime ministers a general election whenever asked, assuming the government had survived an initial period, usually thought to be about six months. Three Canadian prime ministers presiding over minorities have used this power to engineer subsequent victories: Mackenzie King in 1926, John Diefenbaker in 1958 and Pierre Trudeau in 1968. Three times in a century is not a lot, but the very existence of the power made opposition parties more reasonable. They knew that if they obstructed the government too much, they might face an unwanted election.
For a while in early 2007, the opposition seemed to believe Prime Minister Stephen Harper would call an election, even though he had campaigned on fixed election dates, had introduced C-16 and would have looked ridiculous if he had asked for a dissolution. But once the legislation passed, the opposition parties, especially the Liberals, became noticeably more obstructionist, using committees to block government legislation and combining to pass private members' bills directly contrary to government policies already approved in the budget. Moreover, the Liberals ratcheted up their own special brand of obstruction by blocking measures in the Senate after appearing to support them in the Commons.
Before the passage of C-16, a prime minister could have responded by declaring gridlock and asking for an election. Even a behind-the-scenes threat to that effect would have probably sobered up the opposition parties because none actually want an election right now. But with C-16 in place, the government may have to resort to different tactics, declaring high-priority bills to be matters of confidence and daring the opposition to defeat them.
So far, this government has attached confidence only to budgetary bills, following the example of recent Liberal minority governments, such as Mr. Trudeau's in 1972-74 and Mr. Martin's in 2004-05. That is, indeed, the most sensible strategy when your main concern is survival.
However, the Conservatives have shown their staying power, and are well prepared for an election. In contrast, none of the three opposition parties seems to want an election. The Liberals have saddled themselves with an unimpressive leader, have not yet mastered modern fundraising techniques and are organizationally unprepared for the campaign trail. The New Democrats are fighting for space with the Greens. The Bloc Québécois was lucky to have lost just three seats in 2006 and must fear further losses whenever the next writ is dropped, now that the Conservatives have become competitive in francophone Quebec.
Surviving for 18 months has been an impressive achievement for the Conservatives, but mere survival will become increasingly less rewarding unless it is matched by legislative achievement. No government can survive politically if it acquires a reputation for weakness, and that is the risk the Conservatives face if they remain tied up in Parliament.
By using confidence measures more aggressively, the Conservatives can benefit politically. If the opposition parties retreat, the government gets its legislation. If the opposition unites on a matter of confidence, the Conservatives get an election for which they are the best prepared.
"Fortune is a woman," Machiavelli wrote in a now politically incorrect aphorism, "and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force." It is time for the government to take advantage of its advantages.
posted by Peter Wrightwater at
5:12 AM
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